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Introduction.

The Third Philippic seems to have been delivered in the
late spring or early summer of 341 B. C., about two months after the
Speech on the Chersonese, which apparently had little positive result,
though it probably prevented the recall and prosecution of Diopeithes. The
immediate occasion of the Third Philippic was a request from the forces in
the Chersonese for supplies. The general situation is the same as at the
date of the last speech, but the danger to Byzantium is more pressing.
Demosthenes now takes the broad ground of Panhellenic policy, and formally
proposes to send envoys throughout Greece, to unite all the Greek states
against Philip, as well as to send immediate reinforcements and supplies
to the Chersonese.

Many critics, ancient and modern, have regarded this as the greatest of
all Demosthenes' political orations. The lessons of history (from the
speaker's point of view) are repeated and enforced by the citation of
instance after instance. The tone of the speech, while less varied than
that of the last, is grave and intense. The passage (Sec.Sec. 36 ff.) in which
the orator contrasts the spirit of Athenian political life in the past
with that of his own day is one of the most impressive in all his works,
and the nobility of his appeal to the traditional ideals of Athenian
policy has been universally recognized even by his most severe critics.

The speech is found in the MSS. in two forms, of which the shorter omits a
number of passages[1] which the longer includes, though there are signs of
an imperfect blending of the two versions in certain places. It seems
probable that both versions are due to Demosthenes, and the speech may
have been more than once revised by him before publication or
republication. In which form it was delivered there is not sufficient
evidence to show.


{1} Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of the
Assembly, with reference to the aggressions which Philip has been
committing, ever since he concluded the Peace, not only against yourselves
but against all other peoples; and I am sure that all would agree, however
little they may act on their belief, that our aim, both in speech and in
action, should be to cause him to cease from his insolence and to pay the
penalty for it. And yet I see that in fact the treacherous sacrifice of
our interests has gone on, until what seems an ill-omened saying may, I
fear, be really true--that if all who came forward desired to propose, and
you desired to carry, the measures which would make your position as
pitiful as it could possibly be, it could not (so I believe), be made
worse than it is now. {2} It may be that there are many reasons for this,
and that our affairs did not reach their present condition from any one or
two causes. But if you examine the matter aright, you will find that the
chief responsibility rests with those whose aim is to win your favour, not
to propose what is best. Some of them, men of Athens, so long as they can
maintain the conditions which bring them reputation and influence, take no
thought for the future [and therefore think that you also should take
none]; while others, by accusing and slandering those who are actively at
work,[n] are simply trying to make the city spend its energies in
punishing the members of its own body, and so leave Philip free to say and
do what he likes. {3} Such political methods as these, familiar to you as
they are, are the real causes of the evil. And I beg you, men of Athens,
if I tell you certain truths outspokenly, to let no resentment on your
part fall upon me on this account. Consider the matter in this light. In
every other sphere of life, you believe that the right of free speech
ought to be so universally shared by all who are in the city, that you
have extended it both to foreigners and to slaves; and one may see many a
servant in Athens speaking his mind with greater liberty than is granted
to citizens in some other states: but from the sphere of political counsel
you have utterly banished this liberty. {4} The result[n] is that in your
meetings you give yourselves airs and enjoy their flattery, listening to
nothing but what is meant to please you, while in the world of facts and
events, you are in the last extremity of peril. If then you are still in
this mood to-day, I do not know what I can say; but if you are willing to
listen while I tell you, without flattery, what your interest requires, I
am prepared to speak. For though our position is very bad indeed, and much
has been sacrificed, it is still possible, even now, if you will do your
duty, to set all right once more. {5} It is a strange thing, perhaps, that
I am about to say, but it is true. The worst feature in the past is that
in which lies our best hope for the future. And what is this? It is that
you are in your present plight because you do not do any part of your
duty, small or great; for of course, if you were doing all that you should
do, and were still in this evil case, you could not even hope for any
improvement. As it is, Philip has conquered your indolence and your
indifference; but he has not conquered Athens. You have not been
vanquished--you have never even stirred. {6} [Now if it was admitted by us
all that Philip was at war with Athens, and was transgressing the Peace, a
speaker would have to do nothing but to advise you as to the safest and
easiest method of resistance to him. But since there are some who are in
so extraordinary a frame of mind that, though he is capturing cities,
though many of your possessions are in his hands, and though he is
committing aggressions against all men, they still tolerate certain
speakers, who constantly assert at your meetings that it is some of _us_
who are provoking the war, it is necessary to be on our guard and come to
a right understanding on the matter. {7} For there is a danger lest any
one who proposes or advises resistance should find himself accused of
having brought about the war.]

[Well, I say this first of all, and lay it down as a principle, that if it
is open to us to deliberate whether we should remain at peace or should go
to war ...]

{8} Now if it is possible for the city to remain at peace--if the decision
rests with us (that I may make this my starting-point)--then, I say that
we ought to do so, and I call upon any one who says that it is so to move
his motion, and to act and not to defraud us.[n] But if another with
weapons in his hands and a large force about him holds out to you the
_name_ of peace, while his own acts are acts of war, what course remains
open to us but that of resistance? though if you wish to profess peace in
the same manner as he, I have no quarrel with you. {9} But if any man's
conception of peace is that it is a state in which Philip can master all
that intervenes till at last he comes to attack ourselves, such a
conception, in the first place, is madness; and, in the second place, this
peace that he speaks of is a peace which you are to observe towards
Philip, while he does not observe it towards you: and this it is--this
power to carry on war against you, without being met by any hostilities on
your part--that Philip is purchasing with all the money that he is
spending.

{10} Indeed, if we intend to wait till the time comes when he admits that
he is at war with us, we are surely the most innocent persons in the
world. Why, even if he comes to Attica itself, to the very Peiraeus, he
will never make such an admission, if we are to judge by his dealings with
others. {11} For, to take one instance, he told the Olynthians, when he
was five miles from the city, that there were only two alternatives--
either they must cease to live in Olynthus, or he to live in Macedonia:
but during the whole time before that, whenever any one accused him of any
such sentiments, he was indignant and sent envoys to answer the charge.
Again, he marched into the Phocians' country, as though visiting his
allies:[n] it was by Phocian envoys that he was escorted on the march; and
most people in Athens contended strongly that his crossing the Pass would
bring no good to Thebes. {12} Worse still, he has lately seized Pherae[n]
and still holds it, though he went to Thessaly as a friend and an ally.
And, latest of all, he told those unhappy citizens of Oreus[n] that he had
sent his soldiers to visit them and to make kind inquiries; he had heard
that they were sick, and suffering from faction, and it was right for an
ally and a true friend to be present at such a time. {13} Now if, instead
of giving them warning and using open force, he deliberately chose to
deceive these men, who could have done him no harm, though they might have
taken precautions against suffering any themselves, do you imagine that he
will make a formal declaration of war upon you before he commences
hostilities, and that, so long as you are content to be deceived? {14}
Impossible! For so long as you, though you are the injured party, make no
complaint against him, but accuse some of your own body, he would be the
most fatuous man on earth if _he_ were to interrupt your strife and
contentions with one another--to bid you turn upon himself, and so to cut
away the ground from the arguments by which his hirelings put you off,
when they tell you that _he_ is not at war with Athens.

{15} In God's name, is there a man in his senses who would judge by words,
and not by facts, whether another was at peace or at war with him? Of
course there is not. Why, from the very first, when the Peace had only
just been made, before those who are now in the Chersonese had been sent
out, Philip was taking Serrhium[n] and Doriscus, and expelling the
soldiers who were in the castle of Serrhium and the Sacred Mountain, where
they had been placed by your general. {16} But what was he doing, in
acting thus? For he had sworn to a Peace.[n] And let no one ask, 'What do
these things amount to? What do they matter to Athens?' For whether these
acts were trifles which could have no interest for you is another matter;
but the principles of religion[n] and justice, whether a man transgress
them in small things or great, have always the same force. What? When he
is sending mercenaries into the Chersonese, which the king and all the
Hellenes have acknowledged to be yours; when he openly avows that he is
going to the rescue, and states it in his letter, what is it that he is
doing? {17} He tells you, indeed, that he is not making war upon you. But
so far am I from admitting that one who acts in this manner is observing
the Peace which he made with you, that I hold that in grasping at Megara,
in setting up tyrants in Euboea, in advancing against Thrace at the
present moment, in pursuing his machinations in the Peloponnese, and in
carrying out his entire policy with the help of his army, he is violating
the Peace and is making war against you;--unless you mean to say that even
to bring up engines to besiege you is no breach of the Peace, until they
are actually planted against your walls. But you will not say this; for
the man who is taking the steps and contriving the means which will lead
to my capture is at war with me, even though he has not yet thrown a
missile or shot an arrow. {18} Now what are the things which would imperil
your safety, if anything should happen?[n] The alienation of the
Hellespont, the placing of Megara and Euboea in the power of the enemy,
and the attraction of Peloponnesian sympathy to his cause. Can I then say
that one who is erecting such engines of war as these against the city is
at peace with you? {19} Far from it! For from the very day when he
annihilated the Phocians--from that very day, I say, I date the beginning
of his hostilities against you. And for your part, I think that you will
be wise if you resist him at once; but that if you let him be, you will
find that, when you wish to resist, resistance itself is impossible.
Indeed, so widely do I differ, men of Athens, from all your other
advisers, that I do not think there is any room for discussion to-day in
regard to the Chersonese or Byzantium. {20} We _must_ go to their defence,
and take every care that they do not suffer [and we must send all that
they need to the soldiers who are at present there]. But we _have_ to take
counsel for the good of all the Hellenes, in view of the grave peril in
which they stand. And I wish to tell you on what grounds I am so alarmed
at the situation, in order that if my reasoning is correct, you may share
my conclusions, and exercise some forethought for yourselves at least, if
you are actually unwilling to do so for the Hellenes as a whole; but that
if you think that I am talking nonsense, and am out of my senses, you may
both now and hereafter decline to attend to me as though I were a sane
man.

{21} The rise of Philip to greatness from such small and humble
beginnings; the mistrustful and quarrelsome attitude of the Hellenes
towards one another; the fact that his growth out of what he was into what
he is was a far more extraordinary thing than would be his subjugation of
all that remains, when he has already secured so much;--all this and all
similar themes, upon which I might speak at length, I will pass over. {22}
But I see that all men, beginning with yourselves, have conceded to him
the very thing which has been at issue in every Hellenic war during the
whole of the past. And what is this? It is the right to act as he pleases
--to mutilate and to strip the Hellenic peoples, one by one, to attack and
to enslave their cities. {23} For seventy-three years[n] you were the
leading people of Hellas, and the Spartans for thirty years save one;[n]
and in these last times, after the battle of Leuctra,[n] the Thebans too
acquired some power: yet neither to you nor to Thebes nor to Sparta was
such a right ever conceded by the Hellenes, as the right to do whatever
you pleased. Far from it! {24} First of all it was your own behaviour--or
rather that of the Athenians of that day--which some thought immoderate;
and all, even those who had no grievance against Athens, felt bound to
join the injured parties, and to make war upon you. Then, in their turn,
the Spartans, when they had acquired an empire and succeeded to a
supremacy like your own, attempted to go beyond all bounds and to disturb
the established order[n] to an unjustifiable extent; and once more, all,
even those who had no grievance against them, had recourse to war. {25}
Why mention the others? For we ourselves and the Spartans, though we could
originally allege no injury done by the one people to the other,
nevertheless felt bound to go to war on account of the wrongs which we saw
the rest suffering. And yet all the offences of the Spartans in those
thirty years of power, and of your ancestors in their seventy years, were
less, men of Athens, than the wrongs inflicted upon the Greeks by Philip,
in the thirteen years, not yet completed, during which he has been to the
fore. Less do I say? {26} They are not a fraction of them. [A few words
will easily prove this.] I say nothing of Olynthus, and Methone, and
Apollonia, and thirty-two cities in the Thracian region,[n] all
annihilated by him with such savagery, that a visitor to the spot would
find it difficult to tell that they had ever been inhabited. I remain
silent in regard to the extirpation of the great Phocian race. But what is
the condition of Thessaly? Has he not robbed their very cities of their
governments,[n] and set up tetrarchies, that they may be enslaved, not
merely by whole cities, but by whole tribes at a time? {27} Are not the
cities of Euboea even now ruled by tyrants, and that in an island that is
neighbour to Thebes and Athens? Does he not write expressly in his
letters, 'I am at peace with those who choose to obey me'? And what he
thus writes he does not fail to act upon; for he is gone to invade the
Hellespont; he previously went to attack Ambracia;[n] the great city of
Elis[n] in the Peloponnese is his; he has recently intrigued against
Megara;[n] and neither Hellas nor the world beyond it is large enough to
contain the man's ambition. {28} But though all of us, the Hellenes, see
and hear these things, we send no representatives to one another to
discuss the matter; we show no indignation; we are in so evil a mood, so
deep have the lines been dug which sever city from city, that up to this
very day we are unable to act as either our interest or our duty require.
{29} We cannot unite; we can form no combination for mutual support or
friendship; but we look on while the man grows greater, because every one
has made up his mind (as it seems to me) to profit by the time during
which his neighbour is being ruined, and no one cares or acts for the
safety of the Hellenes. For we all know that Philip is like the recurrence
or the attack of a fever or other illness, in his descent upon those who
fancy themselves for the present well out of his reach. {30} And further,
you must surely realize that all the wrongs that the Hellenes suffered
from the Spartans or ourselves they at least suffered at the hands of
true-born sons of Hellas; and (one might conceive) it was as though a
lawful son, born to a great estate, managed his affairs in some wrong or
improper way;--his conduct would in itself deserve blame and denunciation,
but at least it could not be said that he was not one of the family, or
was not the heir to the property. {31} But had it been a slave or a
supposititious son that was thus ruining and spoiling an inheritance to
which he had no title, why, good Heavens! how infinitely more scandalous
and reprehensible all would have declared it to be. And yet they show no
such feeling in regard to Philip, although not only is he no Hellene, not
only has he no kinship with Hellenes, but he is not even a barbarian from
a country that one could acknowledge with credit;--he is a pestilent
Macedonian, from whose country it used not to be possible to buy even a
slave of any value.

{32} And in spite of this, is there any degree of insolence to which he
does not proceed? Not content with annihilating cities, does he not manage
the Pythian games,[n] the common meeting of the Hellenes, and send his
slaves to preside over the competition in his absence? [Is he not master
of Thermopylae, and of the passes which lead into Hellenic territory? Does
he not hold that district with garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not taken
the precedence in consulting the oracle, and thrust aside ourselves and
the Thessalians and Dorians and the rest of the Amphictyons, though the
right is not one which is given even to all of the Hellenes?] {33} Does he
not write to the Thessalians to prescribe the constitution under which
they are to live? Does he not send one body of mercenaries to Porthmus, to
expel the popular party of Eretria, and another to Oreus, to set up
Philistides as tyrant? And yet the Hellenes see these things and endure
them, gazing (it seems to me) as they would gaze at a hailstorm--each
people praying that it may not come their way, but no one trying to
prevent it. Nor is it only his outrages upon Hellas that go unresisted.
{34} No one resists even the aggressions which are committed against
himself. Ambracia and Leucas belong to the Corinthians--he has attacked
them: Naupactus to the Achaeans--he has sworn to hand it over to the
Aetolians: Echinus[n] to the Thebans--he has taken it from them, and is
now marching against their allies the Byzantines--is it not so? {35} And
of our own possessions, to pass by all the rest, is not Cardia, the
greatest city in the Chersonese, in his hands? Thus are we treated; and we
are all hesitating and torpid, with our eyes upon our neighbours,
distrusting one another, rather than the man whose victims we all are. But
if he treats us collectively in this outrageous fashion, what do you think
he will do, when he has become master of each of us separately?

{36} What then is the cause of these things? For as it was not without
reason and just cause that the Hellenes in old days were so prompt for
freedom, so it is not without reason or cause that they are now so prompt
to be slaves. There was a spirit, men of Athens, a spirit in the minds of
the people in those days, which is absent to-day--the spirit which
vanquished the wealth of Persia, which led Hellas in the path of freedom,
and never gave way in face of battle by sea or by land; a spirit whose
extinction to-day has brought universal ruin and turned Hellas upside
down. What was this spirit? [It was nothing subtle nor clever.] {37} It
meant that men who took money from those who aimed at dominion or at the
ruin of Hellas were execrated by all; that it was then a very grave thing
to be convicted of bribery; that the punishment for the guilty man was the
heaviest that could be inflicted; that for him there could be no plea for
mercy, nor hope of pardon. {38} No orator, no general, would then sell the
critical opportunity whenever it arose--the opportunity so often offered
to men by fortune, even when they are careless and their foes are on their
guard. They did not barter away the harmony between people and people, nor
their own mistrust of the tyrant and the foreigner, nor any of these high
sentiments. {39} Where are such sentiments now? They have been sold in the
market and are gone; and those have been imported in their stead, through
which the nation lies ruined and plague-stricken--the envy of the man who
has received his hire; the amusement which accompanies his avowal; [the
pardon granted to those whose guilt is proved;] the hatred of one who
censures the crime; and all the appurtenances of corruption. {40} For as
to ships, numerical strength, unstinting abundance of funds and all other
material of war, and all the things by which the strength of cities is
estimated, every people can command these in greater plenty and on a
larger scale by far than in old days. But all these resources are rendered
unserviceable, ineffectual, unprofitable, by those who traffic in them.

{41} That these things are so to-day, you doubtless see, and need no
testimony of mine: and that in times gone by the opposite was true, I will
prove to you, not by any words of my own, but by the record inscribed by
your ancestors on a pillar of bronze, and placed on the Acropolis [not to
be a lesson to themselves--they needed no such record to put them in a
right mind--but to be a reminder and an example to you of the zeal that
you ought to display in such a cause]. {42} What then is the record?
'Arthmius,[n] son of Pythonax, of Zeleia, is an outlaw, and is the enemy
of the Athenian people and their allies, he and his house.' Then follows
the reason for which this step was taken--'because he brought the gold
from the Medes into the Peloponnese.' {43} Such is the record. Consider,
in Heaven's name, what must have been the mind of the Athenians of that
day, when they did this, and their conception of their position. They set
up a record, that because a man of Zeleia, Arthmius by name, a slave of
the King of Persia (for Zeleia is in Asia), as part of his service to the
king, had brought gold, not to Athens, but to the Peloponnese, he should
be an enemy of Athens and her allies, he and his house, and that they
should be outlaws. {44} And this outlawry is no such disfranchisement as
we ordinarily mean by the word. For what would it matter to a man of
Zeleia, that he might have no share in the public life of Athens? But
there is a clause in the Law of Murder, dealing with those in connexion
with whose death the law does not allow a prosecution for murder [but the
slaying of them is to be a holy act]: 'And let him die an outlaw,' it
runs. The meaning, accordingly, is this--that the slayer of such a man is
to be pure from all guilt. {45} They thought, therefore, that the safety
of all the Hellenes was a matter which concerned themselves--apart from
this belief, it could not have mattered to them whether any one bought or
corrupted men in the Peloponnese; and whenever they detected such
offenders, they carried their punishment and their vengeance so far as to
pillory their names for ever. As the natural consequence, the Hellenes
were a terror to the foreigner, not the foreigner to the Hellenes. It is
not so now. Such is not your attitude in these or in other matters. {46}
But what is it? [You know it yourselves; for why should I accuse you
explicitly on every point? And that of the rest of the Hellenes is like
your own, and no better; and so I say that the present situation demands
our utmost earnestness and good counsel.[n]] And what counsel? Do you bid
me tell you, and will you not be angry if I do so?

[_He reads from the document_.]

{47} Now there is an ingenuous argument, which is used by those who would
reassure the city, to the effect that, after all, Philip is not yet in the
position once held by the Spartans, who ruled everywhere over sea and
land, with the king for their ally, and nothing to withstand them; and
that, none the less, Athens defended herself even against them, and was
not swept away. Since that time the progress in every direction, one may
say, has been great, and has made the world to-day very different from
what it was then; but I believe that in no respect has there been greater
progress or development than in the art of war. {48} In the first place, I
am told that in those days the Spartans and all our other enemies would
invade us for four or five months--during, that is, the actual summer--and
would damage Attica with infantry and citizen-troops, and then return home
again. And so old-fashioned were the men of that day--nay rather, such
true citizens--that no one ever purchased any object from another for
money, but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. {49} But now,
as I am sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and
no issue is decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it
is not because he leads a column of heavy infantry[n] that Philip can
march wherever he chooses, but because he has attached to himself a force
of light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar troops. {50}
And whenever, with such advantages,[n] he falls upon a State which is
disordered within, and in their distrust of one another no one goes out in
defence of its territory, he brings up his engines and besieges them. I
pass over the fact that summer and winter are alike to him--that there is
no close season during which he suspends operations. {51} But if you all
know these things and take due account of them, you surely must not let
the war pass into Attica, nor be dashed from your seat through looking
back to the simplicity of those old hostilities with Sparta. You must
guard against him, at the greatest possible distance, both by political
measures and by preparations; you must prevent his stirring from home,
instead of grappling with him at close quarters in a struggle to the
death. {52} For, men of Athens, we have many natural advantages for a
war,[n] if we are willing to do our duty. There is the character of his
country, much of which we can harry and damage, and a thousand other
things. But for a pitched battle he is in better training than we.

{53} Nor have you only to recognize these facts, and to resist him by
actual operations of war. You must also by reasoned judgement and of set
purpose come to execrate those who address you in his interest,
remembering that it is impossible to master the enemies of the city, until
you punish those who are serving them in the city itself. {54} And this,
before God and every Heavenly Power--this you will not be able to do; for
you have reached such a pitch of folly or distraction or--I know not what
to call it; for often has the fear actually entered my mind, that some
more than mortal power may be driving our fortunes to ruin--that to enjoy
their abuse, or their malice, or their jests, or whatever your motive may
chance to be, you call upon men to speak who are hirelings, and some of
whom would not even deny it; and you laugh to hear their abuse of others.
{55} And terrible as this is, there is yet worse to be told. For you have
actually made political life safer for these men, than for those who
uphold your own cause. And yet observe what calamities the willingness to
listen to such men lays up in store. I will mention facts known to you
all.

{56} In Olynthus, among those who were engaged in public affairs, there
was one party who were on the side of Philip, and served his interests in
everything; and another whose aim was their city's real good, and the
preservation of their fellow citizens from bondage. Which were the
destroyers of their country? which betrayed the cavalry, through whose
betrayal Olynthus perished? Those whose sympathies were with Philip's
cause; those who, while the city still existed brought such dishonest and
slanderous charges against the speakers whose advice was for the best,
that, in the case of Apollonides at least, the people of Olynthus was even
induced to banish the accused.

{57} Nor is this instance of the unmixed evil wrought by these practices
in the case of the Olynthians an exceptional one, or without parallel
elsewhere. For in Eretria,[n] when Plutarchus and the mercenaries had been
got rid of, and the people had control of the city and of Porthmus, one
party wished to entrust the State to you, the other to entrust it to
Philip. And through listening mainly, or rather entirely, to the latter,
these poor luckless Eretrians were at last persuaded to banish the
advocates of their own interests. {58} For, as you know, Philip, their
ally, sent Hipponicus with a thousand mercenaries, stripped Porthmus of
its walls, and set up three tyrants--Hipparchus, Automedon, and
Cleitarchus; and since then he has already twice expelled them from the
country when they wished to recover their position [sending on the first
occasion the mercenaries commanded by Eurylochus, on the second, those
under Parmenio].

{59} And why go through the mass of the instances? Enough to mention how
in Oreus Philip had, as his agents, Philistides, Menippus, Socrates,
Thoas, and Agapaeus--the very men who are now in possession of the city--
and every one knew the fact; while a certain Euphraeus,[n] who once lived
here in Athens, acted in the interests of freedom, to save his country
from bondage. {60} To describe the insults and the contumely with which he
met would require a long story; but a year before the capture of the town
he laid an information of treason against Philistides and his party,
having perceived the nature of their plans. A number of men joined forces,
with Philip for their paymaster and director, and haled Euphraeus off to
prison as a disturber of the peace. {61} Seeing this, the democratic party
in Oreus, instead of coming to the rescue of Euphraeus, and beating the
other party to death, displayed no anger at all against them, and agreed
with a malicious pleasure that Euphraeus deserved his fate. After this the
conspirators worked with all the freedom they desired for the capture of
the city, and made arrangements for the execution of the scheme; while any
of the democratic party, who perceived what was going on, maintained a
panic-stricken silence, remembering the fate of Euphraeus. So wretched was
their condition, that though this dreadful calamity was confronting them,
no one dared open his lips, until all was ready and the enemy was
advancing up to the walls. Then the one party set about the defence, the
other about the betrayal of the city. {62} And when the city had been
captured in this base and shameful manner, the successful party governed
despotically: and of those who had been their own protectors, and had been
ready to treat Euphraeus with all possible harshness, they expelled some
and murdered others; while the good Euphraeus killed himself, thus
testifying to the righteousness and purity of his motives in opposing
Philip on behalf of his countrymen.

{63} Now for what reason, you may be wondering, were the peoples of
Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus more agreeably disposed towards Philip's
advocates than towards their own? The reason was the same as it is with
you--that those who speak for your true good can never, even if they
would, speak to win popularity with you; they are constrained to inquire
how the State may be saved: while their opponents, in the very act of
seeking popularity, are co-operating with Philip. {64} The one party said,
'You must pay taxes;' the other, 'There is no need to do so.' The one
said, 'Go to war, and do not trust him;' the other, 'Remain at peace,'--
until they were in the toils. And--not to mention each separately--I
believe that the same thing was true of all. The one side said what would
enable them to win favour; the other, what would secure the safety of
their State. And at last the main body of the people accepted much that
they proposed--not now from any such desire for gratification, nor from
ignorance, but as a concession to circumstances, thinking that their cause
was now wholly lost. {65} It is this fate, I solemnly assure you, that I
dread for you, when the time comes that you make your reckoning, and
realize that there is no longer anything that can be done. May you never
find yourselves, men of Athens, in such a position! Yet in any case, it
were better to die ten thousand deaths, than to do anything out of
servility towards Philip [or to sacrifice any of those who speak for your
good]. A noble recompense did the people in Oreus receive, for entrusting
themselves to Philip's friends, and thrusting Euphraeus aside! {66} and a
noble recompense the democracy of Eretria, for driving away your envoys,
and surrendering to Cleitarchus! They are slaves, scourged and butchered!
A noble clemency did he show to the Olynthians, who elected Lasthenes to
command the cavalry, and banished Apollonides! {67} It is folly, and it is
cowardice, to cherish hopes like these, to give way to evil counsels, to
refuse to do anything that you should do, to listen to the advocates of
the enemy's cause, and to fancy that you dwell in so great a city that,
whatever happens, you will not suffer any harm. {68} Aye, and it is
shameful to exclaim after the event, 'Why, who would have expected this?
Of course, we ought to have done, or not to have done, such and such
things!' The Olynthians could tell you of many things, to have foreseen
which in time would have saved them from destruction. So too could the
people of Oreus, and the Phocians, and every other people that has been
destroyed. {69} But how does that help them now? So long as the vessel is
safe, be it great or small, so long must the sailor and the pilot and
every man in his place exert himself and take care that no one may capsize
it by design or by accident: but when the seas have overwhelmed it, all
their efforts are in vain. {70} So it is, men of Athens, with us. While we
are still safe, with our great city, our vast resources, our noble name,
what are we to do? Perhaps some one sitting here has long been wishing to
ask this question. Aye, and I will answer it, and will move my motion; and
you shall carry it, if you wish. We ourselves, in the first place, must
conduct the resistance and make preparation for it--with ships, that is,
and money, and soldiers. For though all but ourselves give way and become
slaves, we at least must contend for freedom. {71} And when we have made
all these preparations ourselves, and let them be seen, then let us call
upon the other states for aid, and send envoys to carry our message [in
all directions--to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king; for
it is not unimportant for his interests either that Philip should be
prevented from subjugating the world]; that so, if you persuade them, you
may have partners to share the danger and the expense, in case of need;
and if you do not, you may at least delay the march of events. {72} For
since the war is with a single man, and not against the strength of a
united state, even delay is not without its value, any more than were
those embassies[n] of protest which last year went round the Peloponnese,
when I and Polyeuctus, that best of men, and Hegesippus and the other
envoys went on our tour, and forced him to halt, so that he neither went
to attack Acarnania, nor set out for the Peloponnese. {73} But I do not
mean that we should call upon the other states, if we are not willing to
take any of the necessary steps ourselves. It is folly to sacrifice what
is our own, and then pretend to be anxious for the interests of others--to
neglect the present, and alarm others in regard to the future. I do not
propose this. I say that we must send money to the forces in the
Chersonese, and do all that they ask of us; that we must make preparation
ourselves, while we summon, convene, instruct, and warn the rest of the
Hellenes. That is the policy for a city with a reputation such as yours.
{74} But if you fancy that the people of Chalcis or of Megara will save
Hellas, while you run away from the task, you are mistaken. They may well
be content if they can each save themselves. The task is yours. It is the
prerogative that your forefathers won, and through many a great peril
bequeathed to you. {75} But if each of you is to sit and consult his
inclinations, looking for some way by which he may escape any personal
action, the first consequence will be that you will never find any one who
will act; and the second, I fear, that the day will come when we shall be
forced to do, at one and the same time, all the things we wish to avoid.

{76} This then is my proposal, and this I move. If the proposal is carried
out, I think that even now the state of our affairs may be remedied. But
if any one has a better proposal to make, let him make it, and give us his
advice. And I pray to all the gods that whatever be the decision that you
are about to make, it may be for your good.


FOOTNOTES

[1] These are printed in square brackets in the translation.


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