Epictetus (/ˌɛpɪkˈtiːtəs/; Ancient Greek: Ἐπίκτητος; AD 55–135) was a Greek sage and Stoic philosopher. He was born a slave at Hierapolis, Phrygia (present day Pamukkale, Turkey), and lived in Rome until his banishment, when he went to Nicopolis in northwestern Greece for the rest of his life. His teachings were written down and published by his pupil Arrian in his Discourses.
Philosophy, Epictetus taught, is a way of life and not just a theoretical discipline. To Epictetus, all external events are determined by fate, and are thus beyond our control; we should accept whatever happens calmly and dispassionately. However, individuals are responsible for their own actions, which they can examine and control through rigorous self-discipline.
Suffering occurs from trying to control what is uncontrollable, or from neglecting what is within our power. As part of the universal city that is the universe, it is our duty to care for all our fellow men. Those who follow these precepts will achieve happiness and peace of mind.
Epictetus was born ca. 55 AD, presumably at Hierapolis, Phrygia. The name his parents gave him is unknown; the word epíktetos (επίκτητος) in Greek simply means "acquired." He spent his youth as a slave in Rome to Epaphroditos, a wealthy freedman and secretary to Nero.
Early in life, Epictetus acquired a passion for philosophy, and with the permission of his wealthy owner, he studied Stoic philosophy under Musonius Rufus, which allowed him to rise in respectability as he grew more educated. He somehow became crippled, with Origen stating that his leg was deliberately broken by his master, and Simplicius stating that he had been lame from childhood.
Roman-era ruins at Nicopolis
In some manner Epictetus obtained his freedom, sometime after Nero's death in the year 68 AD., and began to teach philosophy in Rome. About 93 AD Emperor Domitian banished all philosophers from the city, and Epictetus fled to Nicopolis in Epirus, Greece, where he founded a philosophical school.
His most famous pupil, Arrian, studied under him when a young man (c. 108 AD) and claimed to have written the famous Discourses from his lecture notes, though some argue they should be considered an original composition by Arrian, comparable to the Socratic literature. Arrian describes Epictetus as being a powerful speaker who could "induce his listener to feel just what Epictetus wanted him to feel." Many eminent figures sought conversations with him, and the Emperor Hadrian was friendly with him and may have listened to him speak at his school in Nicopolis.
He lived a life of great simplicity, with few possessions and lived alone for a long time, but in his old age he adopted a friend's child who would otherwise have been left to die, and raised him with the aid of a woman. Epictetus was never married. He died sometime around 135 AD. After his death, his lamp was purchased by an admirer for 3,000 drachmae.
No writings of Epictetus himself are really known. His discourses were transcribed and compiled by his pupil Arrian (author of the Anabasis Alexandri). The main work is The Discourses, four books of which have been preserved (out of an original eight). Arrian also compiled a popular digest, entitled the Enchiridion, or Handbook. In a preface to the Discourses, addressed to Lucius Gellius, Arrian states that "whatever I heard him say I used to write down, word for word, as best I could, endeavouring to preserve it as a memorial, for my own future use, of his way of thinking and the frankness of his speech."
Epictetus maintains that the foundation of all philosophy is self-knowledge, that is, the conviction of our ignorance and gullibility ought to be the first subject of our study. Logic provides valid reasoning and certainty in judgment, but it is subordinate to practical needs. The first and most necessary part of philosophy concerns the application of doctrine, for example, that people should not lie; the second concerns reasons, e.g. why people should not lie; while the third, lastly, examines and establishes the reasons. This is the logical part, which finds reasons, shows what is a reason, and that a given reason is a right one. This last part is necessary, but only on account of the second, which again is rendered necessary by the first.
Both the Discourses and the Enchiridion begin by distinguishing between those things in our power (prohairetic things) and those things not in our power (aprohairetic things). That alone is in our power, which is our own work; and in this class are our opinions, impulses, desires, and aversions. What, on the contrary, is not in our power, are our bodies, possessions, glory, and power. Any delusion on this point leads to the greatest errors, misfortunes, and troubles, and to the slavery of the soul.
We have no power over external things, and the good that ought to be the object of our earnest pursuit, is to be found only within ourselves. The determination between what is good and what is not good is made by the capacity for choice (prohairesis). Prohairesis allows us to act, and gives us the kind of freedom that only rational animals have. It is determined by our reason, which of all our faculties sees and tests itself and everything else. It is the right use of the impressions (phantasia) that bombard the mind that is in our power:
Practise then from the start to say to every harsh impression, "You are an impression, and not at all the thing you appear to be." Then examine it and test it by these rules you have, and firstly, and chiefly, by this: whether the impression has to do with the things that are up to us, or those that are not; and if it has to do with the things that are not up to us, be ready to reply, "It is nothing to me."
We will not be troubled at any loss, but will say to ourselves on such an occasion: "I have lost nothing that belongs to me; it was not something of mine that was torn from me, but something that was not in my power has left me." Nothing beyond the use of our opinion is properly ours. Every possession rests on opinion. What is to cry and to weep? An opinion. What is misfortune, or a quarrel, or a complaint? All these things are opinions; opinions founded on the delusion that what is not subject to our own choice can be either good or evil, which it cannot. By rejecting these opinions, and seeking good and evil in the power of choice alone, we may confidently achieve peace of mind in every condition of life.
Reason alone is good, and the irrational is evil, and the irrational is intolerable to the rational. The good person should labour chiefly on their own reason; to perfect this is in our power. To repel evil opinions by the good is the noble contest in which humans should engage; it is not an easy task, but it promises true freedom, peace of mind (ataraxia), and a divine command over the emotions (apatheia). We should especially be on our guard against the opinion of pleasure because of its apparent sweetness and charms. The first object of philosophy, therefore, is to purify the mind.
Epictetus teaches that the preconceptions (prolepsis) of good and evil are common to all. Good alone is profitable and to be desired, and evil is hurtful and to be avoided. Different opinions arise only from the application of these preconceptions to particular cases, and it is then that the darkness of ignorance, which blindly maintains the correctness of its own opinion, must be dispelled. People entertain different and conflicting opinions of good, and in their judgment of a particular good, people frequently contradict themselves. Philosophy should provide a standard for good and evil. This process is greatly facilitated because the mind and the works of the mind are alone in our power, whereas all external things that aid life are beyond our control.
The essence of God is goodness; we have all good that could be given to us. The gods too gave us the soul and reason, which is not measured by breadth or depth, but by knowledge and sentiments, and by which we attain to greatness, and may equal even with the gods. We should, therefore, cultivate the mind with special care. If we wish for nothing but what God wills, we shall be truly free, and all will come to pass with us according to our desire; and we shall be as little subject to restraint as Zeus himself.
Every individual is connected with the rest of the world, and the universe is fashioned for universal harmony. Wise people, therefore, will pursue, not merely their own will, but will also be subject to the rightful order of the world. We should conduct ourselves through life fulfilling all our duties as children, siblings, parents, and citizens.
For our country or friends we ought to be ready to undergo or perform the greatest difficulties. The good person, if able to foresee the future, would peacefully and contentedly help to bring about their own sickness, maiming, and even death, knowing that this is the right order of the universe. We have all a certain part to play in the world, and we have done enough when we have performed what our nature allows. In the exercise of our powers, we may become aware of the destiny we are intended to fulfill.
We are like travellers at an inn, or guests at a stranger's table; whatever is offered we take with thankfulness, and sometimes, when the turn comes, we may refuse; in the former case we are a worthy guest of the gods, and in the latter we appear as a sharer in their power. Anyone who finds life intolerable is free to quit it, but we should not abandon our appointed role without sufficient reason. The Stoic sage will never find life intolerable and will complain of no one, either God or human. Those who go wrong we should pardon and treat with compassion, since it is from ignorance that they err, being as it were blind.
It is only our opinions and principles that can render us unhappy, and it is only the ignorant person that finds fault with another. Every desire degrades us, and renders us slaves of what we desire. We ought not to forget the transitory character of all external advantages, even in the midst of our enjoyment of them; but always to bear in mind that they are not our own, and that therefore they do not properly belong to us. Thus prepared, we shall never be carried away by opinions.
The final entry of the Enchiridion, or Handbook, begins: "Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand":
Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
Wherever thy decree has fixed my lot.
I follow willingly; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched would I follow still.
(Diogenes Laertius quoting Cleanthes; quoted also by Seneca, Epistle 107.)"
Whoe'er yields properly to Fate is deemed
Wise among men, and knows the laws of Heaven.
(From Euripides' Fragments, 965)
O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be.
(From Plato's Crito)
Anytus and Meletus may indeed kill me, but they cannot harm me.
(From Plato's Apology)
Prisoner of war James Stockdale receiving the Medal of Honor from American president Gerald Ford; Stockdale was able to retain his sanity during capture by relying on the philosophy of Epictetus
The philosophy of Epictetus is well known in the American military through the writings and example of James Stockdale, an American fighter pilot who was shot down over North Vietnam, became a prisoner of war during the Vietnam War, and later a vice presidential candidate. In Courage under Fire: Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior (1993), Stockdale credits Epictetus with helping him endure seven and a half years in a North Vietnamese military prison—including torture—and four years in solitary confinement.
In his conclusion, Stockdale quoted Epictetus as saying, "The emotions of grief, pity, and even affection are well-known disturbers of the soul. Grief is the most offensive; Epictetus considered the suffering of grief an act of evil. It is a willful act, going against the will of God to have all men share happiness" (p. 235).
The philosophy of Epictetus was an influence on the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121 to 180 AD) whose reign was marked by wars with the resurgent Parthians in southern Asia and against the Germanic tribes in Europe. Aurelius quotes from Epictetus repeatedly in his own work, Meditations, written during his campaigns in central Europe.
Simplicius of Cilicia
In the 6th century, the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius, who was persecuted for his pagan beliefs during the reign of Justinian, wrote an extant commentary on the Enchiridion. At the end of the commentary Simplicius wrote: "Nor does my writing this commentary prove beneficial to others only, for I myself have already found great advantage from it, by the agreeable diversion it has given me, in a season of trouble and public calamity." George Long considered the commentary "worth reading", but then opined, "But how many will read it? Perhaps one in a million."
When Bernard Stiegler was imprisoned for five years for armed robbery in France, he assembled an "ensemble of disciplines," which he called (in reference to Epictetus) his melete. This ensemble amounted to a practice of reading and writing that Stiegler derived from the writings of Epictetus. This led to his transformation, and upon being released from incarceration he became a professional philosopher. Stiegler tells the story of this transformation in his book, Acting Out.
The philosophy of Epictetus plays a key role in the 1998 novel by Tom Wolfe, A Man in Full. This was in part the outcome of discussions Wolfe had with James Stockdale (see above). The importance of Epictetus' Stoicism for Stockdale, its role in A Man in Full, and its significance in Gladiator (2000 film) is discussed by William O. Stephens in The Rebirth of Stoicism?
Mohun Biswas, in the novel A House for Mr Biswas (1961), by V.S. Naipaul, is pleased to think himself a follower of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; the irony is that he never actually behaves as a Stoic.
“Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it cannot” is the theme of Disturbances in the Field (1983), by Lynne Sharon Schwartz. Lydia, the central character, turns often to The Golden Sayings of Epictetus.
A line from the Enchiridion is used as a title quotation in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman by Laurence Sterne, which translates to, "Not things, but opinions about things, trouble men."  The quotation alludes to a theme of the novel about how the suffering of many of its characters (above all Walter Shandy) is the result of the opinions and assumptions they make about reality.
Epictetus is mentioned in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man by James Joyce: in the fifth chapter of the novel the protagonist Stephen Daedalus discusses Epictetus's famous lamp with a Dean of his college. Epictetus is also mentioned briefly in Franny and Zooey by J. D. Salinger, and is referred to by Theodore Dreiser in his novel Sister Carrie. Both the longevity of Epictetus's life and his philosophy are alluded to in John Berryman's poem, "Of Suicide."
Epictetus is referred to, but not mentioned by name, in Matthew Arnold's sonnet To a Friend. Arnold provides three historical personalities as his inspiration and support in difficult times (Epictetus is preceded by Homer and succeeded by Sophocles):
Much he, whose friendship I not long since won,
That halting slave, who in Nicopolis
Taught Arrian, when Vespasian's brutal son
Cleared Rome of what most shamed him.
Psychologist Albert Ellis, the founder of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy, credited Epictetus with providing a foundation for his system of psychotherapy.
Kiyozawa Manshi, a controversial reformer within the Higashi Honganji branch of Jodo Shinshu Buddhism cited Epictetus as one of the three major influences on his spiritual development and thought.
Epictetus' philosophy is an influence on the acting method introduced by David Mamet and William H. Macy, known as Practical Aesthetics. The main book that describes the method, The Practical Handbook for the Actor, lists the Enchiridion in the bibliography.
Discourses of Epictetus
Enchiridion of Epictetus
^ Jones, Daniel; Roach, Peter, James Hartman and Jane Setter, eds. Cambridge English Pronouncing Dictionary. 17th edition. Cambridge UP, 2006.
^ His year of birth is uncertain. He must have been old enough to teach philosophy by the time Domitian banished all philosophers from Rome ca. 93 AD. He also describes himself as an old man to Arrian ca. 108 AD. cf. Discourses, i.9.10; i.16.20; ii.6.23; etc.
^ Suda. Epictetus.
^ Epaphroditus, livius.org
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.7.32.
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.9.29.
^ Origen, Contra Celcus. vii.
^ to: a b Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion, 13.
^ Douglas J. Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy (2012), p. 197
^ Suetonius, Domitian, x.
^ Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, xv. 11.
^ Hendrik Selle: Dichtung oder Wahrheit – Der Autor der Epiktetischen Predigten. Philologus 145  269-290
^ to: a b c Epictetus, Discourses, prologue.
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.11; ii.14; iii.4; iii. 7; etc.
^ Historia Augusta, Hadrian, 16.
^ Fox, Robin The Classical World: An Epic History from Homer to Hadrian Basic Books. 2006 pg 578
^ A surviving 2nd or 3rd century Altercatio Hadriani Et Epicteti gives a fictitious account of a conversation between Hadrian and Epictetus.
^ Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion, 46. There is also a joke at Epictetus' expense in Lucian's Life of Demonax about the fact that he had no family.
^ Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion, 46. He may have married her, but Simplicius' language is ambiguous.
^ Lucian, Demoxan, c. 55, torn, ii., ed Hemsterh., p. 393; as quoted in A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus With the Encheiridion (2009), p. 6
^ He was apparently alive in the reign of Hadrian (117–138). Marcus Aurelius (born 121 AD) was an admirer of him but never met him, and Aulus Gellius (ii.18.10) writing mid-century, speaks of him as if belonging to the recent past.
^ Lucian, Remarks to an illiterate book-lover.
^ Photius, Bibliotheca, states that there were eight books.
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.11.1
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.7.1-8
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 201
^ Epictetus, Discourses, iii.2.1-6; Enchiridion, 52
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.1; Enchiridion, 1
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 204
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 206
^ Giovanni Reale, John R. Catan, 1990, A History of Ancient Philosophy: The schools of the Imperial Age, page 80. SUNY Press
^ Christopher Gill, 1995, The Discourses of Epictetus, page xx. Everyman
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.1.4; i.20
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.19.32.
^ Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1
^ Epictetus, Discourses, iii.3.14-19; Enchiridion, 6
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.2.1
^ Epictetus, Discourses, iii.8; iii.15.1-13; Enchiridion, 29
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.18.19-31; iii.3.14-22
^ Epictetus, Enchiridion, 34.
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 207
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 208
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.22.1; ii.11.3
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.11.8-13; iii.14.11-14
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 209
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 217
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 218
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.17.22-33
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.12.16-17
^ Epictetus, Discourses, iii.2.4
^ Epictetus, Discourses, iii.20.4-14
^ Epictetus, Discourses, ii.10.4-5
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.2.33-37; Enchiridion, 24, 37
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 220
^ Epictetus, Enchiridion, 11, 15
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.29.29; iii.24.97-101
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 210
^ Epictetus, Discourses, i.18.6-8; i.28.9-10
^ to: a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 211
^ Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, page 212
^ Stockdale, James Bond. 1993. Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior. Stanford: Hoover Institution/Stanford University.
^ Marcus Aurelius, i. 7; iv. 41; vii. 19; xi. 33-37
^ George Long, (1890), The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments, page 390. George Bell and Sons
^ Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
^ William O. Stephens, Ph.D
^ The Rebirth of Stoicism
^ Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman, ed. Ian Campbell Ross (Oxford Univ. Press, 1983), p. 540.
^ (pgs. 202-203 of the Penguin Edition).
^ Matthew Arnold, To A Friend
^ Ageless, Guiltless, by Adam Green.
^ Obituary by Morton Schatzman in The Independent.
^ Obituary by Oliver Burkeman in The Guardian.
The Discourses, trans. W. A. Oldfather. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library edition.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925 & 1928. ISBN 0-674-99145-1 andISBN 0-674-99240-7.
Discourses and Selected Writings, Robert Dobbin (trans.), Oxford: Penguin Classics, 2008 ISBN 978-0-14-044946-4.
Epictetus Discourses: Book 1, Robert Dobbin (trans.), (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998 ISBN 0-19-823664-6.
The Discourses (The Handbook, Fragments), Christopher Gill (trans.) Everyman Edition, 2003 ISBN 0-460-87312-1.
The Handbook, Nicholas P. White (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983 ISBN 0-915145-69-3.
Enchiridion, George Long (trans.), New York: A. L. Burt, 1955 (reprint: New York: Dover, 2004) ISBN 0-87975-703-5.
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Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982, New York: Picador, 2005 ISBN 0-312-42570-8.
Pedro P. Fuentes González. art. "Épictète", in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques III, Paris, CNRS, 2000, pp. 106-151 ISBN 2-271-05748-5.
A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002 ISBN 0-19-924556-8.
Theodore Scaltsas, Andrew S. Mason (ed.), The Philosophy of Epictetus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 ISBN 978-0-1995-8551-9.
Werner Sohn, EPICTETUS: Ein erzkonservativer Bildungsroman mit liberalen Eselsohren (German version) Norderstedt: BoD, 2010 ISBN 978-3-8391-5231-7.
William O. Stephens, Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom, London: Continuum, 2007 ISBN 0-8264-9608-3.
Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be prideful and say, " I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful, and say, " I have a handsome horse," know that you are proud of what is, in fact, only the good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Only your reaction to the appearances of things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear, you will be proud with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own. Epictetus
Medieval Greece / Byzantine Empire
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