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It has already been noticed that when Philip took Amphipolis in
357 B.C., the Olynthians made overtures to the Athenians, with whom they had
been at war for some years, and that, being rejected, they became allies of
Philip, who gave them Anthemus and Poteidaea. In 352, alarmed at Philip's
growing power, they once more applied to Athens. Peace was made, and
negotiations began with regard to an alliance. In 351 Philip appeared in the
territory of Olynthus. He did not, however, at once carry the invasion further,
but took pains, during this year and the next, to foster a Macedonian party in
the town. In 349 Philip virtually declared war on the Olynthians by demanding
the surrender of his step-brother Arrhidaeus, who had taken refuge with them.
The Olynthians again appealed to Athens; an alliance was made; Chares was sent
with thirty ships and 2,000 mercenaries, but seems to have mismanaged the war by
misfortune or by design. Probably he had been badly supplied with funds, and
instead of helping Olynthus, resorted to acts of piracy to satisfy his men. The
Macedonian troops proceeded to take Stageira and other towns of the Olynthian
League, though Philip still professed to have no hostile intentions against
Olynthus (see Phil. III, Sec. ii). Chares was recalled and put on his trial; and,
probably in response to a further message from Olynthus, Charidemus was
transferred thither from the Hellespont. With a considerable mercenary force at
his disposal, Charidemus overran Pallene and Bottiaea, and did some damage to
Philip's territory, but afterwards gave himself up to dissipation in Olynthus.
In the meantime, some of the Thessalians had become restless under Philip's
supremacy (see Olynth. I, Sec. 22, II, Sec. ii), and he was obliged to undertake an
expedition to suppress the revolt, and to put down Peitholaus (who had
apparently become tyrant of Pherae once more, though he had been expelled in
352). But early in 348 he appeared in person in Chalcidice, and took one after
another of the towns of the League, including Mecyberna the port of Olynthus,
and Torone. He thrice defeated the Olynthians in battle, and at last obtained
possession of Olynthus itself by the treachery of Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the
commanders of the Olynthian cavalry.

Athens had probably been occupied during the early part of the year [1] with an
expedition which she sent (against the advice of Demosthenes) to help Plutarchus
of Eretria to repel attacks which were partly, at least, instigated by Philip;
and in consequence she had done little for Olynthus, though on a request of the
Olynthians for cavalry, she had ordered some of those which had been sent to
Euboea to go to Olynthus, and these may have been the Athenians whom Philip
captured in that city. The seventeen ships, 2,000 infantry, and 300 cavalry (all
citizens), which Athens dispatched under Chares in response to a last urgent
appeal from Olynthus, were delayed by storms and arrived too late. Philip
entirely destroyed Olynthus and thirty-two other towns, sold their inhabitants
into slavery, brought the whole of Chalcidice within the Macedonian Empire, and
celebrated his conquests by a festival in honour of the Olympian Zeus at Dium.

The First Olynthiac Oration was delivered before Olynthus itself was attacked or
any other towns actually taken (Olynth. I, Sec. 17); and both the First and Second
before the discontent with Philip in Thessaly had taken an active form (I, Sec. 22,
II, Sec. 7). Both, that is, belong to the summer of 349, and the situation implied
is very much the same in both. The First was perhaps spoken when the Olynthians
first appealed to Athens in that year, before the mission of Chares; the Second,
to counteract the effect of something which had caused despondency in Athens
(possibly the conduct of the Athenian generals, or the account given by other
orators of Philip's power). In both Demosthenes urges the importance of
resisting Philip while he is still far away, and of sending, not mercenaries,
but a citizen-army; and while hinting at what he regards as the true solution of
the financial difficulty, proposes a special war-tax. The solution which he
thinks the right one is more explicitly described in the Third Olynthiac, spoken
(probably [Footnote: See note on Olynth. III, Section 4]) in the autumn of the
same year, and certainly at a time when the situation had become much more
grave. The root of the financial difficulty lay in the existence of a law which
prohibited (evidently under severe penalties, Olynth. III, Section 12) any
proposal to devote to military purposes that portion of the revenues which
constituted the 'Festival' or 'Theoric Fund', and was for the most part
distributed to the citizens to enable them to take part in the public festivals,
and so join in fulfilling what was no doubt a religious duty as well as a
pleasure. This particular form of expenditure is stated to have been introduced
by the demagogue Agyrrhius in 394, when it revived in an extended form a
distribution of theatre money instituted late in the fifth century by Cleophon;
but the special law in question appears to have been of recent date (Olynth.
III, Section 12), and was almost certainly the work of Eubulus and his party.
Demosthenes himself proposes an extraordinary Legislative Commission, to repeal
the mischievous laws and leave the way clear for financial reform. At the same
time he attacks the whole policy of Eubulus, charging him with distributing
doles without regard to public service, adding to the amenities of Athens
instead of maintaining her honour in war, and enriching her politicians while
degrading her people. The main object of the speech was unsuccessful; and just
about this time (though whether before or after the speech is disputed)
Apollodorus proposed that the people should decide whether the surplus revenues
should go to the Festival Fund, or be applied to military purposes, and was
heavily fined for the illegality of the proposal.

The Three Olynthiacs rank high among the Orations of Demosthenes. Some passages,
indeed, show that he had hardly as yet appreciated the genius of Philip, or the
unlikelihood of his making a false move either through over-confidence or
because he had come to the end of his resources. But the noble patriotism of the
speaker, the lofty tone of his political reflections, the clearness of his
diagnosis of the evils of his time, and the fearlessness of his appeal for loyal
and united self-sacrifice, are nowhere more conspicuous.


{1} I believe, men of Athens, that you would give a great sum to know what
policy, in reference to the matter which you are now considering, will best
serve the interests of the city, and since that is so, you ought to be ready and
eager to listen to those who desire to give you their advice. For not only can
you hear and accept any useful proposals which a speaker may have thought out
before he came here; but such, I conceive, is your fortune, that the right
suggestion will often occur to some of those present on the spur of the moment;
and out of all these suggestions it should be easy for you to choose the most
advantageous course.

{2} The present time, men of Athens, seems almost to cry aloud that you must
take matters into your own hands yonder, if you have any interest in a
successful termination of the crisis: and yet our attitude appears to be--I do
not know what. My own opinion, at all events, is that you should at once resolve
to send this assistance; that you should prepare for the departure of the
expedition at the first possible moment--you must not fall victims to the same
error as before--and that you should dispatch an embassy to announce our
intention, and to be present at the scene of action. {3} For what we have most
to fear is this--that he, with his unscrupulous cleverness in taking advantage
of circumstances--now, it may be, by making concessions; now by uttering
threats, which he may well seem likely to fulfil; now by misrepresenting
ourselves and our absence from the scene--may turn and wrest to his own
advantage some of the vital elements of our power. {4} And yet it may fairly be
said, men of Athens, that our best hope lies in that very circumstance which
renders Philip's power so hard to grapple with. The fact that the entire control
over everything, open or secret,[n] is concentrated in the hands of a single
man; that he is at one and the same time general, master, and treasurer; that he
is always present in person with his army--all this is a great advantage, in so
far as military operations must be prompt and well-timed. But as regards the
compact which he would so gladly make with the Olynthians, the effect is just
the reverse. {5} For the Olynthians know well that they are not fighting now for
honour and glory, nor for a strip of territory, but to avert the devastation and
enslavement of their country. They know how he treated[n] those who betrayed to
him their city at Amphipolis, and those who received him at Pydna; and it is, I
imagine, universally true that tyranny is a faithless friend to a free state,
and that most of all, when they occupy adjoining territories. {6} With this
knowledge, men of Athens, and with all the reflections that the occasion calls
for in your minds, I say that now, if ever before, you must make your resolve,
rouse all your energies, and give your minds to the war: you must contribute
gladly, you must go forth in person, you must leave nothing undone. There is no
longer any reason or excuse remaining, which can justify you in refusing to do
your duty. {7} For every one was but recently harping on the desirability of
exciting Olynthus to war with Philip; and this has now come to pass of itself,
and in the way which most completely suits your interests. Had they taken up the
war because you had persuaded them to do so, their alliance might perhaps have
been precarious, and their resolution might only have carried them a certain
way. But now their detestation of Philip is based upon grievances which affect
themselves; and we may suppose that a hostility which is occasioned by their own
fears and sufferings will be a lasting one. {8} Since, therefore, men of Athens,
such an opportunity has been thrown in your way, you must not let it go, nor
fall victims to the mistake from which you have often suffered before. If, for
instance, when we had returned from our expedition in aid of the Euboeans,[n]
and Hierax and Stratocles came from Amphipolis and stood upon this platform and
urged us to sail and take over the city; if, I say, we had continued to display
in our own interest the eagerness which we displayed in the deliverance of the
Euboeans, you would have kept Amphipolis then, and we should have been free from
all the trouble that we have had since. {9} And again, when news kept coming of
the investment of Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and all the other places--
I will not stay to enumerate them all--if we had acted at once, and had gone to
the rescue of the first place attacked, with the energy which we ought to have
shown, we should now have found Philip much less proud and difficult to deal
with. As it is, we are always sacrificing the present, always fancying that the
future will turn out well of itself; and so we have raised Philip to a position
of such importance as no king of Macedonia has ever before attained. {10} And
now an opportunity has come to Athens, in this crisis at Olynthus, as great as
any of those former ones: and I believe, men of Athens, that one who was to draw
up a true account of the blessings which have been given us by the gods, would,
in spite of much that is not as it should be, find great cause for thankfulness
to them; and naturally so. For our many losses in the war must in fairness be
set down to our own indifference; but that we did not suffer such losses long
ago, and that an alliance has presented itself to us, which, if we will only
take advantage of it, will act as a counterpoise to them--all this I, for one,
should set down as a favour due to their goodness towards us. But it is, I
imagine, in politics, as it is in money-making. {11} If a man is able to keep
all that he gets, he is abundantly grateful to Fortune; but if he loses it all
before he is aware, he loses with it his memory of Fortune's kindness. So it is
in politics. When men have not made a right use of their opportunities, they do
not remember any good that heaven may actually have granted them: for it is by
the ultimate issue that men estimate all that they have enjoyed before.
Therefore, men of Athens, you must pay the very utmost heed to the future, that
by the better use you make of it, you may wipe out the dishonour of the past.
{12} But if you sacrifice these men also, men of Athens, and Philip in
consequence reduces Olynthus to subjection, I ask any of you to tell me what is
to prevent him from marching where he pleases. Is there a man among you, men of
Athens, who considers or studies the steps by which Philip, weak enough at
first, has become so strong? First he took Amphipolis, next Pydna, then again
Poteidaea, and then Methone. Next he set foot in Thessaly. {13} Then when
Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia[n] were secured for his purposes, just as it suited
him, he departed to Thrace. In Thrace, after expelling one prince and setting up
another, he fell ill. When he grew easier again, he showed no inclination to
take things easily, but at once attacked the Olynthians[n]--and I am passing
over his campaigns against the Illyrians and the Paeonians, against Arybbas,[n]
and in every possible direction.

{14} Why, I may be asked, do I mention these things at the present moment? I
wish you to understand, men of Athens, and to realize these two points: first,
the unprofitableness of perpetually sacrificing your interests one by one; and,
secondly, the restless activity which is a part of Philip's very being, and
which will not allow him to content himself with his achievements and remain at
peace. For if it is to be his fixed resolve, that he must always be aiming at
something greater than he has yet attained; and ours, that we will never set
ourselves resolutely to work; ask yourselves what you can expect to be the end
of the matter. {15} In God's name, is there one of you so innocent as not to
know that the war will be transferred from Olynthus to Attica, if we pay no
heed? But if that happens, men of Athens, I fear that we shall be like men who
light-heartedly borrow at a high rate of interest, and after a brief period of
affluence, lose even their original estate; that like them we shall find that
our carelessness has cost us dear; that through making pleasure our standard in
everything, we shall find ourselves driven to do many of those unpleasant things
which we wished to avoid, and shall find our position even in our own country

{16} I may be told that it is easy to criticize--any one can do that; but that a
political adviser is expected to offer some practical proposal to meet the
existing situation. Now I am well aware, men of Athens, that in the event of any
disappointment, it is not upon those who are responsible that your anger falls,
but upon those who have spoken last upon the subject in question. Yet I do not
think that consideration for my own safety should lead me to conceal my
conviction as to the course which your interests demand. {17} I say then that
there are two things which you must do to save the situation. You must rescue
these towns [n] for the Olynthians, and send troops to accomplish this: and you
must damage Philip's country with your ships and with a second body of troops.
{18} If you neglect either of these things, our campaign, I greatly fear, will
be in vain. For suppose that you inflict damage on his country, and that he
allows you to do so, while he reduces Olynthus; he will have no difficulty in
repelling you when he returns. Suppose, on the other hand, that you only go to
the help of Olynthus; he will see that he has nothing to fear at home, and so he
will sit down before the town and remain at his task, until time enables him to
get the better of the besieged. The expedition, therefore, must be large, and it
must be in two parts.

Such is my view with regard to the expedition. {19} As to the sources of supply,
you have funds, men of Athens--funds larger than any one else in the world; but
you appropriate these without scruple, just as you choose. Now if you will
assign these to your troops, you need no further supplies: otherwise, not only
do you need further supplies--you are destitute of supplies altogether. 'Well'
(does someone say?), 'do you move that this money should form a war-fund?' I
assure you that I make no such motion. {20} For while I do indeed believe that a
force ought to be made ready [and that this money should form a war-fund], and
that the receipt of money should be connected, as part of one and the same
system, with the performance of duty; you, on the contrary, think it right to
take the money, after your present fashion, for your festivals, and spare
yourselves trouble. And therefore, I suppose, our only resource is a general
tax--larger or smaller, according to the amount required. In any case, we need
funds, and without funds nothing can be done that we ought to do. Various other
sources of supply are suggested by different persons. Choose whichever you think
best of these, and get to work, while you have the opportunity.

{21} It is worth while to remember and to take into account the nature of
Philip's position at this moment. For neither are his affairs at present in such
good order, or in so perfectly satisfactory a state, as might appear to any but
a careful observer; nor would he ever have commenced this present war, if he had
thought that he would really have to fight. He hoped at first that by his mere
advance he would carry all before him; and he has since discovered his mistake.
This disappointment, then, is the first thing which disturbs him and causes him
great despondency: {22} and next there is the disposition of the Thessalians,
naturally inconstant as we know it has always been found by all men; and what it
has always been, that, in the highest degree, Philip finds it now. For they have
formally resolved to demand from him the restitution of Pagasae; they have
prevented him from fortifying Magnesia, and I myself heard it stated that they
intend even to refuse him the enjoyment of their harbour and market dues for the
future. These, they say, should go to maintain the public administration of
Thessaly, instead of being taken by Philip. But if he is deprived of these
funds, the resources from which he must maintain his mercenaries will be reduced
to the narrowest limits. {23} Nay, more: we must surely suppose that the
chieftains of the Paeonians and Illyrians, and in fact all such personages--
would prefer freedom to slavery; for they are not accustomed to obey orders, and
the man, they say, is a bully. Heaven knows, there is nothing incredible in the
statement. Unmerited success is to foolish minds a fountain-head of perversity,
so that it is often harder for men to keep the good they have, than it was to
obtain it. {24} It is for you then, men of Athens, to regard his difficulty as
your opportunity, to take up your share of the burden with readiness, to send
embassies to secure all that is required, to join the forces yourselves, and to
stir up every one else to do so. Only consider what would happen, if Philip got
such an opportunity to strike at us, and there was war on our frontier. Can you
not imagine how readily he would march against us? Does it arouse no shame in
you, that, when you have the opportunity, you should not dare to do to him even
as much as you would have to suffer, were he able to inflict it?

{25} There is a further point, men of Athens, which must not escape you. I mean
that you have now to choose whether you are to carry on war yonder, or whether
he is to do so in your own country. If the resistance of Olynthus is maintained,
you will fight there and will inflict damage on Philip's territory, while you
remain secure in the enjoyment of this land of your own which you now possess.
But if Philip captures Olynthus, who is to hinder him from marching to Athens?
The Thebans? {26} It seems, I fear, too bitter a thing to say; but they will be
glad to join him in the invasion. The Phocians? They cannot protect their own
country, unless you go to their aid, or some other power. 'But, my good Sir,'[n]
you say, 'he will not want to march here.' And yet it would be one of the
strangest things in the world, if, when he has the power, he does not carry out
the threats, which he now blurts out in spite of the folly that they show. {27}
But I suppose that I need not even point out how vast is the difference between
war here and war in his country. For had you to camp outside the walls
yourselves, for only thirty days, and to take from the country such things as
men in camp must have--and I am assuming that there is no enemy in the country--
I believe that the loss your farmers would suffer would exceed your whole
expenditure on the war up to the present time. What then must we think will be
the extent of our loss, if ever war comes to our doors? And besides the loss
there is his insolence, and the shame of our position, which to right-minded men
is as serious as any loss.

{28} When you take a comprehensive view of these things you must all go to the
rescue and stave the war off yonder; you who are well-to-do, in order that, with
a small expense in defence of the great fortunes which you quite rightly enjoy,
you may reap the benefit of the remainder without fear; you who are of military
age, that you may gain your experience of war in Philip's country, and so become
formidable guardians of a fatherland unspoiled; and your orators, that they may
find it easy to render an account of their public life; for your judgement upon
their conduct will itself depend upon the position in which you find yourselves.
And may that be a happy one, on every ground!


{1} Many as are the occasions, men of Athens, on which we may discern the
manifestation of the goodwill of Heaven towards this city, one of the most
striking is to be seen in the circumstances of the present time. For that men
should have been found to carry on war against Philip; men whose territory
borders on his and who possess some power; men, above all, whose sentiments in
regard to the war are such that they think of the proposed compact with him, not
only as untrustworthy, but as the very ruin of their country--this seems to be
certainly the work of a superhuman, a divine, beneficence. {2} And so, men of
Athens, we must take care that we do not treat ourselves less well than
circumstances have treated us. For it is a shameful thing--nay, it is the very
depth of shame--to throw away openly, not only cities and places which were once
in our power, but even the allies and the opportunities which have been provided
for us by Fortune.

{3} Now to describe at length the power of Philip, men of Athens, and to incite
you to the performance of your duty by such a recital, is not, I think, a
satisfactory proceeding; and for this reason--that while all that can be said on
this subject tends to Philip's glory, it is a story of failure on our part. For
the greater the extent to which his success surpasses his deserts, the greater
is the admiration with which the world regards him; while, for your part, the
more you have fallen short of the right use of your opportunities, the greater
is the disgrace that you have incurred. {4} I will therefore pass over such
considerations. For any honest inquirer must see that the causes of Philip's
rise to greatness lie in Athens, and not in himself. Of the services for which
he has to thank those whose policy is determined by his interest--services for
which you ought to require their punishment--the present is not, I see, the
moment to speak. But apart from these, there are things which may be said, and
which it is better that you should all have heard--things which (if you will
examine them aright) constitute a grave reproach against him; and these I will
try to tell you.

{5} If I called him perjured and faithless, without giving his actions in
evidence, my words would be treated as idle abuse, and rightly: and it happens
that to review all his actions up to the present time, and to prove the charge
in every case, requires only a short speech. It is well, I think, that the story
should be told, for it will serve two purposes; first, to make plain the real
badness of the man's character; and secondly, to let those who are over-alarmed
at Philip, as if he were invincible, see that he has come to the end of all
those forms of deceit by which he rose to greatness, and that his career is
already drawing to its close. {6} For I, too, men of Athens, should be regarding
Philip with intense fear and admiration, if I saw that his rise was the result
of a righteous policy. {7} But when I study and consider the facts, I find that
originally, when certain persons wished to drive from your presence the
Olynthians who desired to address you from this place, Philip won over our
innocent minds by saying that he would deliver up Amphipolis to us, and by
inventing the famous secret understanding; that he afterwards conciliated the
Olynthians by seizing Poteidaea, which was yours, and injuring their former
allies by handing it over to themselves; and that, last of all, he recently won
over the Thessalians, by promising to give up Magnesia to them, and undertaking
to carry on the war with the Phocians on their behalf. There is absolutely no
one who has ever had dealings with him that he has not deluded; and it is by
deceiving and winning over, one after another, those who in their blindness did
not realize what he was, that he has risen as he has done. {8} And therefore,
just as it was by these deceptions that he rose to greatness, in the days when
each people fancied that he intended to do some service to themselves; so it is
these same deceptions which should drag him down again, now that he stands
convicted of acting for his own ends throughout. Such, then, is the crisis, men
of Athens, to which Philip's fortunes have now come. If it is not so, let any
one come forward and show me (or rather you) that what I say is untrue; or that
those who have been deceived at the outset trust him as regards the future; or
that those who have been brought into unmerited bondage would not gladly be

{9} But if any of you, while agreeing with me so far, still fancies that Philip
will maintain his hold by force, because he has already occupied fortified posts
and harbours and similar positions, he is mistaken. When power is cemented by
goodwill, and the interest of all who join in a war is the same, then men are
willing to share the labour, to endure the misfortunes, and to stand fast. But
when a man has become strong, as Philip has done, by a grasping and wicked
policy, the first excuse, the least stumble, throws him from his seat and
dissolves the alliance. {10} It is impossible, men of Athens, utterly
impossible, to acquire power that will last, by unrighteousness, by perjury, and
by falsehood. Such power holds out for a moment, or for a brief hour; it
blossoms brightly, perhaps, with fair hopes; but time detects the fraud, and the
flower falls withered about its stem. In a house or a ship, or any other
structure, it is the foundations that must be strongest; and no less, I believe,
must the principles, which are the foundation of men's actions, be those of
truth and righteousness. Such qualities are not to be seen to-day in the past
acts of Philip.

{11} I say, then, that we should help the Olynthians; and the best and quickest
method which can be proposed is the method which I approve. Further, we should
send an embassy to the Thessalians--to some, to inform them of our intention; to
others, to spur them on; for even now they have resolved to demand the
restitution of Pagasae, and to make representations in regard to Magnesia. {12}
Take care, however, men of Athens, that our envoys may not only have words to
speak, but also actions of yours to point to. Let it be seen that you have gone
forth in a manner that is worthy of Athens, and are already in action. Words
without the reality must always appear a vain and empty thing, and above all
when they come from Athens; for the more we seem to excel in the glib use of
such language, the more it is distrusted by every one. {13} The change, then,
which is pointed out to them must be great, the conversion striking. They must
see you paying your contributions, marching to war, doing everything with a
will, if any of them is to listen to you. And if you resolve to accomplish all
this in very deed, as it should be accomplished, not only will the feeble and
untrustworthy nature of Philip's alliances be seen, but the weakness of his own
empire and power will also be detected.

{14} The power and empire of Macedonia is, indeed, to speak generally, an
element which tells considerably as an addition to any other power. You found it
so when it helped you against the Olynthians in the days of Timotheus;[n] the
Olynthians in their turn found its help of some value, in combination with their
own strength, against Poteidaea; and it has recently come to the aid of the
Thessalians, in their disordered and disturbed condition, against the ruling
dynasty: and wherever even a small addition is made to a force, it helps in
every way. {15} But in itself the Macedonian Empire is weak and full of manifold
evils. Philip has in fact rendered his own tenure of it even more precarious
than it naturally was, by these very wars and campaigns which might be supposed
to prove his power. For you must not imagine, men of Athens, that Philip and his
subjects delight in the same things. Philip has a passion for glory--that is his
ambition; and he has deliberately chosen to risk the consequences of a life of
action and danger, preferring the glory of achieving more than any King of
Macedonia before him to a life of security. {16} But his subjects have no share
in the honour and glory. Constantly battered about by all these expeditions, up
and down, they are vexed with incessant hardships: they are not suffered to
pursue their occupations or attend to their own affairs: for the little that
they produce, as best they can, they can find no market, the trading stations of
the country being closed on account of the war. {17} From these facts it is not
difficult to discover the attitude of the Macedonians in general towards Philip;
and as for the mercenaries and Infantry of the Guard who surround him, though
they have the reputation of being a fine body of well-drilled warriors, I am
told by a man who has been in Macedonia, and who is incapable of falsehood, that
they are no better than any other body of men. {18} Granted that there may be
experienced campaigners and fighters among them; yet, he tells me, Philip is so
jealous of honour, that he thrusts all such men away from him, in his anxiety to
get the credit of every achievement for himself; for in addition to all his
other qualities, his jealousy is insurpassable. On the other hand, any generally
temperate or upright man, who cannot endure the dissolute life there, day by
day, nor the drunkenness and the lewd revels, is thrust on one side and counts
for nothing. {19} Thus he is left with brigands and flatterers, and men who,
when in their cups, indulge in dances of a kind which I shrink from naming to
you now. And it is evident that this report is true; for men whom every one
tried to drive out of Athens, as far viler than even the very juggler in the
street--Callias the public slave and men like him, players of farces, composers
of indecent songs, written at the expense of their companions in the hope of
raising a laugh--these are the men he likes and keeps about him. {20} You may
think that these are trivial things, men of Athens: but they are weighty, in the
judgement of every right-minded man, as illustrations of the temper with which
Philip is cursed. At present, I suppose, these facts are overshadowed by his
continual prosperity. Success has a wonderful power of throwing a veil over
shameful things like these. But let him only stumble, and then all these
features in his character will be displayed in their true light. And I believe,
men of Athens, that the revelation is not far off, if Heaven be willing and you
desirous of it. {21} So long as a man is in good health, he is unconscious of
any weakness; but if any illness comes upon him, the disturbance affects every
weak point, be it a rupture or a sprain or anything else that is unsound in his
constitution. And as with the body, so it is with a city or a tyrant. So long as
they are at war abroad, the mischief is hidden from the world at large, but the
close grapple of war on the frontier brings all to light.

{22} Now if any of you, men of Athens, seeing Philip's good fortune, thinks that
this makes him a formidable enemy to fight against, he reasons like a sensible
man: for fortune weighs heavily in the scale--nay, fortune is everything, in all
human affairs. And yet, if I were given the choice, it is the fortune of Athens
that I should choose, rather than that of Philip, provided that you yourselves
are willing to act even to a small extent as you should act. For I see that
there are far more abundant grounds for expecting the goodwill of Heaven on your
side than on his. {23} But here, of course, we are sitting idle; and one who is
a sluggard himself cannot require his friends to help him, much less the gods.
It is not to be wondered at that Philip, who goes on campaigns and works hard
himself, and is always at the scene of action, and lets no opportunity go, no
season pass, should get the better of us who delay and pass resolutions and ask
for news; nor do I wonder at it. It is the opposite that would have been
wonderful--if we, who do nothing that those who are at war ought to do, were
successful against one who leaves nothing undone. {24} But this I do wonder at,
that you who once raised your hand against Sparta, in defence of the rights of
the Hellenes--you, who with opportunities often open to you for grasping large
advantages for yourselves, would not take them, but to secure for others their
rights spent your own fortunes in war-contributions, and always bore the brunt
of the dangers of the campaign--that you, I say, are now shrinking from
marching, and hesitating to make any contribution to save your own possessions;
and that, though you have often saved the rest of the Hellenes, now all together
and now each in their turn, you are sitting idle, when you have lost what was
your own. {25} I wonder at this; and I wonder also, men of Athens, that none of
you is able to reckon up the time during which you have been fighting with
Philip, and to consider what you have been doing while all this time has been
going by. Surely you must know that it is while we have been delaying, hoping
that some one else would act, accusing one another, bringing one another to
trial, hoping anew--in fact, doing practically what we are doing now--that all
the time has passed. {26} And have you now so little sense, men of Athens, as to
hope that the very same policy, which has made the position of the city a bad
one instead of a good, will actually make it a good one instead of a bad? Why,
it is contrary both to reason and to nature to think so! It is always much
easier to retain than to acquire. But now, owing to the war, none of our old
possessions is left for us to retain; and so we must needs acquire. {27} This,
therefore, is our own personal and immediate duty; and accordingly I say that
you must contribute funds, you must go on service in person with a good will,
you must accuse no one before you have become masters of the situation; and then
you must honour those who deserve praise, and punish the guilty, with a
judgement based upon the actual facts. You must get rid of all excuses and all
deficiencies on your own part; you cannot examine mercilessly the actions of
others, unless you yourselves have done all that your duty requires. {28} For
why is it, do you think, men of Athens, that all the generals whom you dispatch
avoid this war,[n] and discover private wars of their own--if a little of the
truth must be told even about the generals? It is because in this war the prizes
for which the war is waged are yours, and if they are captured, you will take
them immediately for your own; but the dangers are the personal privilege of
your commanders, and no pay is forthcoming: while in those wars the dangers are
less, and the profits--Lampsacus, Sigeum, and the ships which they plunder--go
to the commanders and their men. Each force therefore takes the road that leads
to its own advantage. {29} For your part, when you turn your attention to the
serious condition of your affairs, you first bring the commanders to trial; and
then, when you have given them a hearing, and have been told of the difficulties
which I have described, you acquit them. The result, therefore, is that while
you are quarrelling with one another and broken into factions-one party
persuaded of this, another of that--the public interest suffers. You used, men
of Athens, to pay taxes by Boards:[n] to-day you conduct your politics by
Boards. On either side there is an orator as leader, and a general under him;
and for the Three Hundred, there are those who come to shout. The rest of you
distribute yourselves between the two parties, some on either side. {30} This
system you must give up: you must even now become your own masters; you must
give to all alike their share in discussion, in speech and in action. If you
assign to one body of men the function of issuing orders to you, like tyrants;
to another, that of compulsory service as trierarchs or tax-payers or soldiers;
and to another, only that of voting their condemnation, without taking any share
in the labour, nothing that ought to be done will be done in time. For the
injured section will always be in default, and you will only have the privilege
of punishing them instead of the enemy. {31} To sum up, all must contribute,
each according to his wealth, in a fair proportion: all must go on active
service in turn, until you have all served: you must give a hearing to all who
come forward, and choose the best course out of all that you hear--not the
course proposed by this or that particular person. If you do this, you will not
only commend the proposer of that course at the time, but you will commend
yourselves hereafter, for the whole position of your affairs will be a better


{1} Very different reflections suggest themselves to my mind, I men of Athens,
when I turn my eyes to our real situation, and when I think of the speeches that
I hear. For I observe that the speeches are all concerned with the taking of
vengeance upon Philip; whereas in reality matters have gone so far, that we have
to take care that we are not ourselves the first to suffer: so that those who
speak of vengeance are actually, as it seems to me, suggesting to you a false
conception of the situation which you are discussing. {2} That there was a time
when the city could both keep her own possessions in safety, and punish Philip,
I am very well aware. For it was not long ago, but within my own lifetime, that
both these things were so. But I am convinced that it is now quite enough for us
as a first step to make sure of the preservation of our allies. If this is
safely secured, we shall then be able to consider upon whom vengeance is to
fall, and in what way. But until the first step is properly conceived, I
consider it idle to say anything whatever about the last.

{3} If ever the most anxious deliberation was required, it is required in the
present crisis; and my greatest difficulty is not to know what is the proper
advice to give you in regard to the situation: I am at a loss rather to know,
men of Athens, in what manner I should address you in giving it. For I am
convinced by what I have heard with my own ears in this place that, for the most
part, the objects of our policy have slipped from our grasp, not because we do
not understand what our duty is, but because we will not do it; and I ask you to
suffer me, if I speak without reserve, and to consider only whether I speak
truly, and with this object in view--that the future may be better than the
past. For you see that it is because certain speakers make your gratification
the aim of their addresses, that things have gone on getting worse, till at last
the extremity has been reached.

{4} I think it necessary, first, to remind you of a few of the events which have
taken place. You remember, men of Athens, that two or three years ago[n] the
news came that Philip was in Thrace, besieging Heraeon Teichos. That was in the
month of November. Amidst all the discussion and commotion which took place in
this Assembly, you passed a resolution that forty warships should be launched,
that men under forty-five years of age should embark in person, and that we
should pay a war-tax of 60 talents. {5} That year came to an end, and there
followed July, August, September. In the latter month, after the Mysteries,[n]
and with reluctance, you dispatched Charidemus[n] with ten ships, carrying no
soldiers, and 5 talents of silver. For so soon as news had come that Philip was
sick or dead--both reports were brought--you dismissed the armament, men of
Athens, thinking that there was no longer any occasion for the expedition. But
it was the very occasion; for had we then gone to the scene of action with the
same enthusiasm which marked our resolution to do so, Philip would not have been
preserved to trouble us to-day. {6} What was done then cannot be altered. But
now a critical moment in another campaign has arrived; and it is in view of
this, and to prevent you from falling into the same error, that I have recalled
these facts. How then shall we use this opportunity, men of Athens? For unless
you will go to the rescue 'with might and main to the utmost of your power',[n]
mark how in every respect you will have served Philip's interest by your conduct
of the war. {7} At the outset the Olynthians possessed considerable strength,
and such was the position of affairs, that neither did Philip feel safe against
them, nor they against Philip. We made peace with them, and they with us. It was
as it were a stumbling-block in Philip's path, and an annoyance to him, that a
great city which had made a compact with us should sit watching for any
opportunity he might offer. We thought that we ought to excite them to war with
him by every means; and now this much-talked-of event has come to pass--by what
means, I need not relate. {8} What course then is open to us, men of Athens, but
to go to their aid resolutely and eagerly? I can see none. Apart from the shame
in which we should be involved, if we let anything be lost through our
negligence, I can see, men of Athens, that the subsequent prospect would be
alarming in no small degree, when the attitude of the Thebans towards us is what
it is, when the funds of the Phocians are exhausted,[n] and when there is no one
to prevent Philip, so soon as he has made himself master of all that at present
occupies him, from bringing his energies to bear upon the situation further
south. {9} But if any of you is putting off until then his determination to do
his duty, he must be desirous of seeing the terrors of war close at hand, when
he need only hear of them at a distance, and of seeking helpers for himself,
when now he can give help to others. For that this is what it must come to, if
we sacrifice the present opportunity, we must all, I think, be fairly well

{10} 'But,' some one may say, 'we have all made up our minds that we must go to
their aid, and we will go. Only tell us how we are to do it.' Now do not be
surprised, men of Athens, if I give an answer which will be astonishing to most
of you. You must appoint a Legislative Commission.[n] But when the commissioners
meet, you must not enact a single law--you have laws enough--you must cancel
the laws which, in view of present circumstances, are injurious to you. {11} I
mean the laws which deal with the Festival Fund--to put it quite plainly--and
some of those which deal with military service: for the former distribute your
funds as festival-money to those who remain at home; while the latter give
immunity to malingerers,[n] and thereby also take the heart out of those who
want to do their duty. When you have cancelled these laws, and made the path
safe for one who would give the best advice, then you can look for some one to
propose what you all know to be expedient. {12} But until you have done this,
you must not expect to find a man who will be glad to advise you for the best,
and be ruined by you for his pains; for you will find no one, particularly when
the only result will be that some unjust punishment will be inflicted on the
proposer or mover of such measures, and that instead of helping matters at all,
he will only have made it even more dangerous in future than it is at present to
give you the best advice. Aye, and you should require the repeal of these laws,
men of Athens, from the very persons who proposed them.[n] {13} It is not fair
that those who originally proposed them should enjoy the popularity which was
fraught with such mischief to the whole State, and that the unpopularity, which
would lead to an improvement in the condition of us all, should be visited to
his cost upon one who now advises you for the best. Until you have thus prepared
the way, men of Athens, you must entertain no expectation whatever that any one
will be influential enough here to transgress these laws with impunity, or
senseless enough to fling himself to certain ruin.

{14} At the same time, men of Athens, you must not fail to realize this further
point. No resolution is worth anything, without the willingness to perform at
least what you have resolved, and that heartily. For if decrees by themselves
could either compel you to do what you ought, or could realize their several
objects unaided, you would not be decreeing many things and performing few--nay,
none--of the things that you decree, nor would Philip have insulted you so long.
{15} If decrees could have done it, he would have paid the penalty long ago. But
it is not so. Actions come later than speeches and voting in order of procedure,
but in effectiveness they are before either and stronger than either. It is
action that is still needed; all else you already have. For you have those among
you, men of Athens, who can tell you what your duty is; and no one is quicker
than you are to understand the speaker's bidding. Aye, and you will be able to
carry it out even now, if you act aright. {16} What time, what opportunity, do
you look for, better than the present? When, if not now, will you do your duty?
Has not the man seized every position from us already? If he becomes master of
this country too, will not our fate be the most shameful in the world? And the
men whom we promised to be ready to save, if they went to war--are they not now
at war? {17} Is he not our enemy? Are not our possessions in his hands? Is he
not a barbarian? Is he not anything that you choose to call him? In God's name,
when we have let everything go, when we have all but put everything into his
hands, shall we then inquire at large who is responsible for it all? That we
shall never admit our own responsibility, I am perfectly sure. Just so amid the
perils of war, none of those who have run away accuses himself; he accuses his
general, his neighbour--any one but himself; and yet, I suppose, all who have
run away have helped to cause the defeat. He who now blames the rest might have
stood fast; and if every one had done so, the victory would have been theirs.
{18} And so now, if a particular speaker's advice is not the best, let another
rise and make a proposal, instead of blaming him; and if some other has better
advice to give, carry it out, and good fortune be with you. What? Is the advice
disagreeable? That is no longer the speaker's fault--unless, of course, he
leaves out the prayer that you expect of him. There is no difficulty in the
prayer, men of Athens; a man need only compress all his desires into a short
sentence. But to make his choice, when the question for discussion is one of
practical policy, is by no means equally easy. _Then_ a man is bound to choose
what is best, instead of what is pleasant, if both are not possible at once.
{19} But suppose that some one is able, without touching the Festival Fund, to
suggest other sources of supply for military purposes--is not he the better
adviser? Certainly, men of Athens--if such a thing _is_ possible. But I should
be surprised if it ever has happened or ever should happen to any one to find,
after spending what he has upon wrong objects, that what he has _not_ is wealth
enough to enable him to effect right ones. Such arguments as these find, I
think, their great support in each man's personal desire, and, for that reason,
nothing is easier than to deceive oneself; what a man desires, he actually
fancies to be true. {20} But the reality often follows no such principle.
Consider the matter, therefore, men of Athens, after this fashion; consider in
what way our objects can be realized under the circumstances, and in what way
you will be able to make the expedition and to receive your pay. Surely it is
not like sober or high-minded men to submit light-heartedly to the reproach
which must follow upon any shortcomings in the operations of the war through
want of funds--to seize your weapons and march against Corinthians and
Megareans,[n] and then to allow Philip to enslave Hellenic cities, because you
cannot find rations for your troops.

{21} These words do not spring from a wanton determination to court the ill-will
of any party among you. I am neither so foolish nor so unfortunate as to desire
unpopularity when I do not believe that I am doing any good. But a loyal citizen
ought, in my judgement, to care more for the safety of his country's fortunes
than for the popularity of his utterances. Such, I have heard, and perhaps you
have heard it also, was the principle which the orators of our forefather's time
habitually followed in public life--those orators who are praised by all who
rise to address you, though they are far from imitating them--the great
Aristides, and Nicias, and my own namesake, and Pericles. {22} But ever since
these speakers have appeared who are always asking you, 'what would you like?'
'what may I propose for you?' 'what can I do to please you?' the interests of
the city have been wantonly given away for the sake of the pleasure and
gratification of the moment; and we see the consequences--the fortunes of the
speakers prosper, while your own are in a shameful plight. {23} And yet
consider, men of Athens, the main characteristics of the achievements of your
forefathers' time, and those of your own. The description will be brief and
familiar to you; for you need not have recourse to the history of others, when
your own will furnish examples, by following which you may achieve prosperity.
{24} Our forefathers, who were not courted and caressed by their politicians as
you are by these persons to-day, were leaders of the Hellenes, with their
goodwill, for forty-five years;[n] they brought up into the Acropolis more than
10,000 talents; the king[n] who then ruled Macedonia obeyed them as a foreigner
ought to obey a Hellenic people; serving in person, they set up many glorious
trophies for victories by land and sea; and alone of all mankind they left
behind them, as the crown of their exploits, a fame that is beyond the reach of
envy. {25} Such was the part they played in the Hellenic world: and now
contemplate the manner of men they were in the city, both in public and in
private life. As public men, they gave us buildings and objects of such beauty
and grandeur, in the temples which they built and the offerings which they
dedicated in them, that no room has been left for any of those that come after
to surpass them: while in private life they were so modest, {26} so intensely
loyal to the spirit of the constitution, that if any one actually knows what the
house of Aristides, or Miltiades, or any other of the glorious men of that day,
is like, he can see that it is no more imposing than those of their neighbours.
For it was not to win a fortune that they undertook affairs of State; but each
thought it his duty to add to the common weal. And thus, acting in a spirit of
good faith towards the Hellenes, of piety towards the gods, and of equality
towards one another, they naturally attained great prosperity. {27} Such was the
national life of those times, when those whom I have mentioned were the foremost
men in the State. How do matters stand to-day, thanks to these worthy persons?
Is there any likeness, any resemblance, to old times? Thanks to them (and though
I might say much, I pass over all but this), when we had the field, as you see,
completely open to us--when the Spartans had been ruined,[n] and the Thebans had
their hands full,[n] and no other power could seriously dispute the supremacy
with us on the field of battle--when we could have retained our own possessions
in safety, and have stood as umpires of the rights of others--we have been
deprived of our own territory; {28} we have spent more than 1,500 talents to no
good purpose; the allies whom we had gained in the war,[n] these persons have
lost in time of peace; and we have trained Philip to be the powerful enemy to us
that he is. Let any one rise and tell me how Philip has grown so strong, if we
ourselves are not the source of his strength. {29} 'But, my good Sir,' you say,
'if we are badly off in these respects, we are at any rate better off at home.'
And where is the proof of this? Is it in the whitewashing of the battlements,
the mending of the roads, the fountains, and all such trumperies? Look then at
the men whose policy gives you these things. Some of them who were poor have
become rich; others, who were unknown to fame, have risen to honour; some of
them have provided themselves with private houses more imposing than our public
buildings; and the lower the fortunes of the city have fallen, the higher theirs
have risen.

{30} What is the cause of all these things? Why is it that all was well then,
and all is amiss to-day? It is because then the people itself dared to act and
to serve in the army; and so the people was master of its politicians; all
patronage was in its own hands; any separate individual was content to receive
from the people his share of honour or office or other emolument. The reverse is
now the case. {31} All patronage is in the hands of the politicians, while you,
the people, emasculated, stripped of money and allies, have been reduced to the
position of servile supernumeraries, content if they give you distributions of
festival-money, or organize a procession at the Boedromia;[n] and to crown all
this bravery, you are expected also to thank them for giving you what is your
own. They pen you up closely in the city; they entice you to these delights;
they tame you till you come to their hand. {32} But a high and generous spirit
can never, I believe, be acquired by men whose actions are mean and poor; for
such as a man's practice is, such must his spirit be. And in all solemnity I
should not be surprised if I suffered greater harm at your hands for telling you
the things that I have told you, than the men who have brought them to pass.
Even freedom of speech is not possible on all subjects in this place, and I
wonder that it has been granted me to-day.

{33} If, even now, you will rid yourselves of these habits, if you will resolve
to join the forces and to act worthily of yourselves, converting the
superfluities which you enjoy at home into resources to secure our advantage
abroad, then it may be, men of Athens, it may be, that you will gain some great
and final good, and will be rid of these your perquisites, which are like the
diet that a physician gives a sick man--diet which neither puts strength into
him nor lets him die. For these sums which you now share among yourselves are
neither large enough to give you any adequate assistance, nor small enough to
let you renounce them and go about your business; but these it is that[2]
increase the indolence of every individual among you. {34} 'Is it, then, paid
service that you suggest?'[n] some one will ask. I do, men of Athens; and a
system for immediate enforcement which will embrace all alike; so that each,
while receiving his share of the public funds may supply whatever service the
State requires of him.[3] If we can remain at peace, then he will do better to
stay at home, free from the necessity of doing anything discreditable through
poverty. But if a situation like the present occurs, then supported by these
same sums, he will serve loyally in person, in defence of his country. If a man
is outside the military age, then let him take, in his place among the rest,
that which he now receives irregularly and without doing any service, and let
him act as an overseer and manager of business that must be done. {35} In short,
without adding or subtracting anything,[n] beyond a small sum, and only removing
the want of system, my plan reduces the State to order, making your receipt of
payment, your service in the army or the courts, and your performance of any
duty which the age of each of you allows, and the occasion requires, all part of
one and the same system. But it has been no part of my proposal that we should
assign the due of those who act to those who do nothing; that we should be idle
ourselves and enjoy our leisure helplessly, listening to tales of victories won
by somebody's mercenaries;[n] for this is what happens now. {36} Not that I
blame one who is doing some part of your duty for you; but I require you to do
for yourselves the things for which you honour others, and not to abandon the
position which your fathers won through many a glorious peril, and bequeathed to

I think I have told you all that, in my belief, your interest demands. May you
choose the course which will be for the good of the city and of you all!


[1] See notes to Speech on the Peace, Sec. 5. Some date the Euboean expedition and
the sending of the cavalry one or two years earlier, and the whole chronology is
much disputed; but there are strong arguments for the date (348) given in the

[2] [Greek: esti tauta ta].

[3] [Greek: touto parechae].



(_Note_.--Most of the allusions in the Olynthiacs are explained by the
Introduction to the First Philippic.)

Sec. 4. _power over everything, open or secret_. The translation generally
approved, 'power to publish or conceal his designs,' is hardly possible.
The [Greek: kai] in the phrase [Greek: rh_eta kai aporr_eta] (or [Greek:
arr_eta]) cannot be taken disjunctively here, when it is always
conjunctive in this phrase elsewhere, the whole phrase being virtually
equivalent to 'everything whatever'.

Sec. 5. _how he treated_, &c. The scholiast says that Philip killed the
traitors at Amphipolis first, saying that if they had not been faithful to
their own countrymen, they were not likely to be faithful to himself; and
that the traitors at Pydna, finding that they were not likely to be
spared, took sanctuary, and having been persuaded to surrender themselves
on promise of their lives, were executed nevertheless. Neither story is
confirmed by other evidence.

Sec. 8. _in aid of the Euboeans_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for
Megalopolitans, Sec. 14 n.

Sec. 13. _Magnesia_. There seems to have been a town of the same name as the

_attacked the Olynthians_. This refers to the short invasion of 351 (see
vol. i, p. 70), not to that which is the subject of the Olynthiacs.

_Arybbas_ was King of the Molossi, and uncle of Philip's wife, Olympias.
Nothing is known of this expedition against him. He was deposed by Philip
in 343. (See vol. ii, p. 3.)

Sec. 17. _these towns_: the towns of the Chalcidic peninsula, over which
Olynthus had acquired influence. This sentence shows that Olynthus itself
had not yet been attacked.

Sec. 26. _But, my good Sir_, &c. This must be the objection of an imaginary
opponent. It can hardly be taken (as seems to be intended by Butcher) as
Demosthenes' reply to the question, 'Or some other power?' ('But, my good
Sir, the other power will not want to help him.') There is, however, much
to be said for Sandys's punctuation, [Greek: _ean m_e bo_eth_es_eth umeis
_e allos tis_], 'unless you or some other power go to their aid.' After
the death of Onomarchus in 352, the Phocians were incapable of
withstanding invasion without help.


Sec. 14. _Timotheus, &c_. In 364 an Athenian force under Timotheus invaded
the territory of the Olynthian League, and took Torone, Poteidaea, and
other towns, with the help of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia.

_ruling dynasty_: i.e. the dynasty of Lycophron and Peitholaus at Pherae.
(See Introd. to First Philippic.)

Sec. 28. _this war_: i.e. the war with Philip generally. The reference is
supposed to be to the conduct of Chares in 356 (cf. Phil. I, Section 24
ii.), though in fact it was against the revolted allies, not against
Philip, that he had been sent. Sigeum was a favourite resort of Chares,
and it is conjectured that he may have obtained possession of Lampsacus
and Sigeum (both on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont) in 356. The
explanation of the conduct of the generals is to be found in the fact that
in Asia Minor they could freely appropriate prizes of war and plunder,
since under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens could claim
nothing in Asia for her own.

Sec. 29. _taxes by Boards_. Each of the Boards constituted in 378-377 for the
collection of the war-tax (see vol. i, p. 31) had a leader or chairman
([Greek: __hegem_on_]), one of the 300 richest men in Athens, whose duty it
was to advance the sums required by the State, recovering them afterwards
from the other members of the Boards. Probably the Three Hundred were
divided equally among the 100 Boards, a leader, a 'second', and a 'third'
(Speech on Crown, Sec. 103) being assigned to each. The 'general' here
perhaps corresponds to the 'second'.


Sec. 4. _two or three years ago_ (lit. 'this is the third or fourth year
since). It was in November 352 B.C. If the present Speech was delivered
before November 349, not quite three years would have elapsed. (The Greek
words, [Greek: triton _he tetarton etos touti], must, on the analogy of
the Speech against Meidias, Sec. 13, against Stephanus, II. Sec. 13, and against
Aphobus, I. Sec. 24, &c., mean 'two or three', not 'three or four years
ago'). The vagueness of the expression is more likely to be due to the
date of the Third Olynthiac being not far short of three years from that
of the siege of Heraeon Teichos, than to the double-dating (on the one
hand by actual lapse of time, and on the other by archon-years--from July
to July--or by military campaigning seasons) which most commentators
assume to be intended here, but which seems to me over-subtle and unlike

_that year_: i.e. the archonship of Aristodemus, which ran from July 352
B.C. to July 351.

Sec. 5. _the mysteries_. These were celebrated from the 14th to the 27th of
Boedromion (late in September).

_Charidemus_, of Oreus in Euboea, was a mercenary leader who had served
many masters at different times--Athens, Olynthus, Cotys, and
Cersobleptes--and had played most of them false at some time or other. But
he was given the citizenship in 357 for the part which he had taken in
effecting the cession of the Chersonese to Athens, and was a favourite
with the people. He was sent on the occasion here referred to with ten
ships, for which he was to find mercenary soldiers.

Sec. 6. _with might ... power_. A quotation, probably from the text of the
treaty of alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

Sec. 8. _funds of the Phocians are exhausted_. The Phocian leader Phalaecus
had been using the temple-treasures of Delphi, but they were now

Sec. 10. _a Legislative Commission_: i.e. a Special Commission on the model
of the regular Commission which was appointed annually from the jurors for
the year (if the Assembly so decreed), and before which those who wished
to make or to oppose changes in the laws appeared, the proceedings taking
the form of a prosecution and defence of the laws in question. The
Assembly itself did not legislate, though it passed decrees, which had to
be consistent with the existing laws. As regards legislation, it merely
decided whether in any given year alterations in the laws should or should
not be allowed.

Sec. 11. _malingerers_. The scholiast says that the choregi were persuaded to
choose persons as members of their choruses, in order to enable them to
escape military service, choreutae being legally exempted. Other
exemptions also existed.

Sec. 12. _persons who proposed them_. This can only refer to Eubulus and his

Sec. 20. _Corinthians and Megareans_. From the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech on
the Constitution ([Greek: _pe_ri suntaxe_os_]) and from Philochorus
(quoted in the Scholia of Didymus upon that Speech) it appears that the
Athenians had in 350 invaded Megara, under the general Ephialtes, and
forced the Megareans to agree to a delimitation of certain land sacred to
the two goddesses of Eleusis, which the Megareans had violated, perhaps
for some years past (see Speech against Aristocrates, Sec. 212). A scholiast
also refers to the omission by Corinth to invite the Athenians to the
Isthmian games, in consequence of which the Athenians sent an armed force
to attend the games. Probably this was also a recent occurrence, and due
to an understanding between Corinth and Megara.

Sec. 21. _my own namesake_: i.e. Demosthenes, who was a distinguished general
during the Peloponnesian War, and perished in the Sicilian expedition.

Sec. 24. _for forty-five years_: i.e. between the Persian and Peloponnesian
Wars, 476-431 B.C.

_the king_: i.e. Perdiccas II, who, however, took the side of Sparta
shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He died in 413. (The
date of the beginning of his reign is unknown, but he did not become sole
king of the whole of Macedonia until 436.)

Sec. 27. _Spartans had been ruined_: sc. by the battles of Leuctra (in 371)
and Mantineia (in 362).

_Thebans had their hands full_, owing to the war with the Phocians, from
356 onwards.

Sec. 28. _in the war_, when Athens joined Thebes against Sparta (in 378).
'The allies' are those members of the Second Delian League (formed in 378)
who had been lost in the Social War which ended in or about 355, when
Athens was at peace with Thebes and Sparta. (See Introduction, vol. i, p.

Sec. 31. _procession at the Boedromia_. The Boedromia was a festival held in
September in honour of Apollo and Artemis Agrotera, Probably a procession
was not a regular part of the festival at this time. The importance which
the populace attached to such processions is illustrated by the Speech
against Timocrates, Sec. 161.

Sec. 34. _is it then paid service, &c_.: almost, 'do you then suggest that we
should _earn_ our money?'

Sec. 35. _adding or subtracting_: sc. from the sums dispensed by the State to
the citizens.

_somebody's mercenaries_. The reference is probably to the successes of
Charidemus when first sent (see Introd. to Olynthiacs).



Hellenica World